The Good and the Right by NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro & Zimmerman, Michael
The Good and the Right
MICHAEL J. ZIMMERMAN
University of North Carolina at Greensboro
T. M. Scanlon has revived a venerable tradition according to which something’s being
good consists in its being such that there is a reason to respond positively towards it.
He has presented novel arguments for this thesis. In this article, I first develop some
refinements of the thesis with a view to focusing on intrinsic value in particular, then
discuss the relation between the thesis and consequentialism, then critically examine
Scanlon’s arguments for the thesis, and finally turn to the question whether we should
reject the thesis on the grounds that, when there is a reason to respond positively towards
something, this is so because the thing in question is good. Two appendices follow. In the
first, I discuss whether it is good to do right. In the second, I discuss whether an act’s
being wrong provides a reason not to do it.
I
It is customary to divide normative concepts into two broad categories,
the evaluative (‘the good’) and the deontic (‘the right’). Among the
evaluative concepts are the concepts of what is good, what is bad
and what is neutral. It is not clear (to me) just how this list might
be extended, except that it should include the comparative concepts
of what is better and what is worse. The deontic concepts are more
numerous (or at least we have more names for them). They include the
concepts of what is right, fitting, suitable, appropriate, correct, justified,
warranted; of what is wrong, unfitting, unsuitable, inappropriate,
incorrect, unjustified, unwarranted; of what is obligatory, required,
imperative, mandatory; and also floating around somewhere in this
mix is the concept of a reason.
There are normative concepts other than the evaluative and the
deontic – those of praise- and blameworthiness, for example, and those
of super- and suberogation. Just how these concepts relate to those of
the evaluative and the deontic is an interesting question: the former
appear to overlap with the latter but also to extend beyond them. I
will not address this question here. Instead, I will concentrate on the
interconnections between the good and the right. More particularly, I
will focus on a thesis that has recently been endorsed by T. M. Scanlon
but whose origin can be traced back through A. C. Ewing to Franz
Brentano and perhaps beyond.1 That thesis may initially be put simply
1 See T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass., 1998), pp. 95–
100; A. C. Ewing, The Definition of Good (London, 1948), ch. 5; F. Brentano, The Origin
of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong (London, 1969 [originally published in 1889]),
p. 18. Compare H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th edn. (London, 1907), p. 112.
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as follows:
G: x is good = df. x is valuable.
The plan of this article is the following. In Section II, I will explain
how thesis G is to be understood and develop some refinements of it
with a view to focusing on intrinsic value in particular. In Section III,
I will discuss the relation between G and consequentialism. In Section
IV, I will critically examine Scanlon’s reasons for thinking G true. In
Section V, I will consider other reasons for thinking G true and reasons
for thinking it false and discuss what its being false implies. There will
then come two appendices. In the first, I will discuss whether it is good
to do right. In the second, I will discuss whether an act’s being wrong
provides a reason not to do it.
II
To say that something, x, is valuable is not simply to say that it can be
valued. It is to say that it ought to be valued; valuing x is the right way
to respond to it. Thesis G thus asserts a strong connection between the
good and the right. As just indicated, other terms can be and have been
used to express the deontic side of this connection. We could say that
it is fitting to value x, or suitable to do so, or appropriate, and so on; or
that x is worthy of being valued, or deserves to be valued, and so on.
Perhaps there are subtle differences here that merit investigation, but
undertaking this would take us too far afield. Instead let me use yet
another term to express the idea at issue, one that is currently all the
rage: there is a reason to value x. Thus:
V: x is valuable = df. there is a reason to value x.
In light of V, G becomes
G1: x is good = df. there is a reason to value x.
To understand what G1 comes to, it is important to take note
of a vexing ambiguity in the verb ‘to value’. Surely one common
way of understanding an expression of the form ‘S values x’ is as
follows:
v1: S values x = df. S ascribes value to x, i.e.
S judges x to be of value, i.e.
S judges x to be good.
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But this poses an immediate problem: G1 and v1 are jointly circular.
Another common way2 to understand ‘S values x’ is as follows:
v2: S values x = df. S judges x to be valuable.
But this too poses an immediate problem: V and v2 are jointly circular.
To avoid such problems with circularity, we must accept that the verb ‘to
value’ is doing double duty. Apart from the common sense(s) identified
in v1 and v2 there is also this sense: to value something is to have
what is often called a ‘pro-attitude’ towards it, that is, to be disposed to
respond positively towards it in some way. I will use the verb ‘to favour’
to refer to this disposition. Thus:
v3: S values x = df. S favours x.
In light of v3, G may now be recast once again as follows:
G2: x is good = df. there is a reason to favour x.3
(Since Scanlon will be the focus of discussion later, it is worth noting
now some difficulties with his own use of the terms ‘to value’ and
‘valuable’. He says: ‘To value something is to take oneself to have
reasons for holding certain positive attitudes towards it and for acting
in certain ways in regard to it.’4 This corresponds pretty well with the
sense of ‘to value’ given in v2. He continues: ‘To claim that something is
valuable . . . is to claim that others also have reason to value it, as you
do.’5 This is odd. First, in this sentence ‘to value’ is most naturally
understood in terms of v3 rather than v2, although Scanlon gives
no hint that he takes himself to be switching senses. Second, it is
implausible to maintain that what is valuable must be impersonally
so. Surely some things – old family photos, for instance – can be,
and one can find them to be, valuable for or to oneself but not for
or to others; that is, they are, and one can find them to be, such
that one oneself has a reason to favour them even though others do
not.)
Thesis G2 concerns the concept of goodness in general. It can and
should be refined. One refinement has to do with the distinction
between non-derivative and derivative goodness; the former has to do
with what is good ‘for its own sake’, whereas the latter has to do with
2 Some may wonder whether it is another way. That depends in part on whether G is
true.
3 Interesting upshot: to say that something has value or is of value – see v1 – is to
ascribe to it some evaluative property, whereas to say that it is valuable – in the sense of
‘to value’ captured in v3 – is to ascribe to it some deontic property.
4 Scanlon, What We Owe, p. 95.
5 Scanlon, What We Owe, p. 95.
The Good and the Right 329
what is good ‘for the sake of something else’. Thus:
G2a: x is non-derivatively good = df. there is a reason to favour x for
its own sake;
G2b: x is derivatively good = df. there is a reason to favour x for the
sake of something else to which x is related in some way.
Notice three things about these theses, in light of which still further
refinement can be made. First, the sort of reason at issue has not been
specified; it could be prudential, moral, legal, aesthetic, and so on.
Second, just who (if anyone) has a reason to favour x has not been
specified. Third, the sort of relation at issue in G2b has not been
specified; it could be a means–end relation, a part–whole relation, a
sign–signified relation, and so on.
As I noted in Section I, my aim in this article is to focus on intrinsic
value in particular. I have in mind the sort of value that G. E. Moore
ascribes to pleasure, beauty and knowledge when he says that they
(among other things) are intrinsically good.6 Evidently, Moore has a
kind of non-derivative value in mind.7 But what kind? Well, one thing
that seems clear is that it is an impersonal kind; something cannot
be intrinsically good, in the relevant sense, for one person but not for
another. I would also say that it is an ethical or moral kind. This may
not be so clear – indeed, it is quite controversial – but consider the
following. Suppose that you are attracted to the idea that there is a
reason to favour that which is good. Imagine that John becomes aware
of something that is intrinsically good (in the Moorean sense) – for
example, he sees a news report of some mother in a foreign land crying
tears of joy when her child is rescued from a burning building – but he
does not respond positively towards it. He is unmoved. You accuse him
of being hard-hearted. He replies: ‘What has that child’s being saved
got to do with me? I have no reason to be glad about it.’ Surely this reply
is defective. But how? It is true that John has no prudential reason to
be glad at the news; he is no better off for it. Likewise, he has no legal or
aesthetic reason to be glad at it. I submit that he has a moral reason to
be glad at it; his failure so to respond is indicative of a moral deficiency,
an ethical insensitivity, in him.
6 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge, 1903 [rev. edn. 1993]), ch. 6.
7 He also has in mind a kind of value that supervenes entirely on its bearers’ intrinsic
properties. It is controversial whether the non-derivative value in question must have this
feature. I will not pursue this issue. For discussion, see C. M. Korsgaard, ‘Two Distinctions
in Goodness’, Philosophical Review 92 (1983); S. Kagan, ‘Rethinking Intrinsic Value’,
Journal of Ethics 2 (1998); W. Rabinowicz and T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, ‘A Distinction in
Value: Intrinsic and For Its Own Sake’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1999);
M. J. Zimmerman, The Nature of Intrinsic Value (Lanham, 2001), ch. 3.
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To forestall one possible misunderstanding: in saying that John has a
moral reason to be glad at the news, I am not saying that he is morally
obligated (even prima facie) so to respond. One can be morally obligated
to do something only if one is in control of doing it, and John might not
be in control of such a response.8 But even if he cannot control his
response, it makes sense to say that his being glad at the news would
be a morally fitting way to respond to it – that the news calls for or
requires such a response from him. To say, then, that John has a moral
reason to be glad at the news is to say that there is a moral requirement
that he so respond, even if this requirement is not tantamount to an
obligation.9
This observation brings to light another vexing ambiguity, this time
in the term ‘reason’ itself. What exactly constitutes the reason that I
have alleged that John has to be glad at the news? Does the reason
consist in his being required to respond in this way, or does it consist
in that which requires him to respond in this way? As far as I can tell,
both the former sense (the ‘requirement’ sense) and the latter sense
(the ‘requirer’ sense) are legitimate senses of the term. That is, we
can equally well say that the news is a reason (‘requirer’ sense) for
John to be glad or that the news gives him a reason (‘requirement’
sense) to be glad. The distinction between these two senses of ‘reason’
is easy to overlook, since for every requirement there is a ground
that plays the role of requirer, and nothing can play the role of
requirer unless it grounds a requirement. Nonetheless, our linguistic
conventions seem sometimes to mark the distinction. To say ‘Jane has
more reason (singular) than John to respond in that way’ is to invoke the
‘requirement’ sense of ‘reason’; it is to say that (a) Jane’s requirement to
respond in the way in question is stronger than John’s. To say ‘Jane has
more reasons (plural) than John to respond in that way’ is to invoke
either the ‘requirement’ or the ‘requirer’ sense of ‘reason’; one may
mean either that (b) Jane has more requirements than John, or that
(c) there are more grounds for Jane’s requirement(s) than for John’s.
It is important to note the strict independence of (a), on the one hand,
from (b) and (c), on the other. Jane may have more reasons than John
to respond in the way in question, yet John may have more reason
than Jane so to respond; it is not necessarily the case (although it
may frequently be the case) that the strength of one’s requirements
increases as the number of their grounds increases. I will return to this
issue in Section IV below.
8 For a treatment of the general conditions of moral obligation, see M. J. Zimmerman,
The Concept of Moral Obligation (Cambridge, 1996).
9 For further discussion of such requirement, see Zimmerman, Nature, sects. 4.4–4.6.
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To forestall another possible misunderstanding: in saying that John’s
failure to be glad at the news is a moral failing, I am not saying either
that the mother’s joy is morally good or that the child’s presumed suf-
fering is morally bad. All that I am saying is that the joy is intrinsically
good and the suffering intrinsically bad and that, in virtue of this fact,
John has a moral reason to be glad at the news. You might agree but
think that it is true only of some intrinsic goods that there is a moral
reason to favour them and true only of some intrinsic evils that there
is a moral reason to disfavour them. Not so, I believe; it is true of all.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that Michelangelo’s artistic works
are intrinsically good. If so, then I am committed to saying that we have
a moral reason to favour them. This may seem odd: you may accept that
we have an aesthetic reason to favour them but balk at saying that we
have a moral reason to do so. Now, I acknowledge that there is an
aesthetic reason to admire Michelangelo’s works for their own sakes
and that they are therefore non-derivatively aesthetically good. If we
do admire his works for this reason, we thereby evince an appropriate
aesthetic sensitivity. But Michelangelo’s works’ being non-derivatively
aesthetically good does not imply their being intrinsically good in (what
I take to be) the Moorean sense. If they are intrinsically good, then we
should favour them for their own sakes, regardless of our aesthetic
capacities. If they are intrinsically good, then a blind man has, once he
has been made aware of them, just as much reason to favour them for
their own sakes as someone who is looking directly at them. What kind
of ‘should’, what kind of reason is this? I submit that it is a moral one.
I will not belabour this point further here,10 however, since, as will
become apparent, I will not need to rely on it. All that needs to be noted
is that the type of reason at issue is a normative one of some sort, and
this is something that everyone can acknowledge. Nonetheless, let me
now state, in the terms that I prefer, the particular version of thesis G
on which I wish to concentrate:
IG: x is intrinsically good = df. anyone who is aware of x has a moral
reason to favour it for its own sake.
III
In Principia Ethica, Moore gives the following account of moral
rightness:
R: some act, a, is the morally right thing for someone, S, to
do = df. a is the best thing for S to do (i.e. a ‘together with its
10 The issue is treated at somewhat greater length in M. J. Zimmerman, ‘The Moral
Aspect of Nonmoral Goods and Evils’, Utilitas 11 (1999), pp. 9–13.
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consequences presents a greater sum of intrinsic value than any
possible alternative’).11
It is clear that Moore is hereby proposing that we understand moral
rightness in terms of intrinsic goodness. The proponent of IG, on the
other hand, is claiming that we should understand intrinsic goodness
in terms of moral rightness. It may therefore seem that such a person
is ‘reversing’ Moore’s position.12 But, actually, this is misleading, for IG
and R are compatible. The proponent of R, such as Moore, is concerned
with what it is morally right to do overall or all things considered, that
is, with what there is conclusive moral reason to do. The proponent
of IG, on the other hand, is concerned with what there is some moral
reason to do, that is, with what is prima facie morally right.13 No one
wishes to say that, whenever one is aware of something intrinsically
good, one is overall morally required to favour it for its own sake, for
there could well be some overriding countervailing moral reason not
to do so. The upshot is that it is perfectly consistent to analyse overall
moral rightness in terms of intrinsic goodness, as R does, and then
to analyse intrinsic goodness in turn in terms of prima facie moral
rightness, as IG does. So we should not think of IG as being opposed in
any way to the Moorean brand of consequentialism captured by R.14
11 Moore, Principia, p. 25 [rev. edn., p. 76].
12 This is what Dancy says in J. Dancy, ‘Should We Pass the Buck?’, Philosophy, the
Good, the True and the Beautiful, ed. A. O’Hear (Cambridge, 2000), p. 161.
13 There is also this difference: the proponent of R is concerned with the sort of rightness
that is related to moral obligation in particular, whereas (as noted in the last section)
the proponent of IG is concerned only with that sort of rightness that is related to moral
requirement in general.
14 Contrast A. C. Ewing, Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy (New York, 1959), p.
104. Moore himself never uses the term ‘consequentialism’ to refer to his view, although
this term has now become standard. It is not very apt. Note that R employs the phrase ‘a
“together with its consequences” ’. C. D. Broad uses the term ‘optimific’ to refer to that act
whose consequences are, on the whole, intrinsically best and the term ‘optimizing’ to refer
to that act which, together with its consequences, presents the greatest sum of intrinsic
value. (See C. D. Broad, ‘Certain Features in Moore’s Ethical Doctrines’, The Philosophy
of G. E. Moore, ed. P. A. Schilpp (Evanston, 1942), pp. 48–9.) Clearly, in Principia Ethica
Moore claims that an act’s being overall morally right is a matter of its being optimizing,
not optimific. The term ‘consequentialism’ would be better suited to the view that an
act’s being overall morally right is a matter of its being optimific, since whether an act
is optimific turns solely on the intrinsic values of its consequences (and of those of its
alternatives) and not also on the intrinsic value of the act itself.
It may seem that the term ‘consequentialism’ is better suited to the view of overall
moral rightness that Moore espouses in his later book, Ethics, but the matter is
complicated. It is true that in this later work Moore characterizes what it is ‘best’ to
do in terms of what is optimific rather than what is optimizing – see G. E. Moore,
Ethics (Oxford, 1965 [originally published in 1912]) – and it may therefore seem
that he is thereby modifying his understanding of consequentialism. But I think this
appearance is misleading. The explanation for the change in his characterization of
‘best’ is, I believe, as follows. In Ethics Moore begins by proposing a theory that he
calls ‘utilitarianism’, which is a combination of hedonism and consequentialism. This
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It has been claimed that IG in fact implies a form of consequentialism.
(Clearly, the term ‘consequentialism’ is now being used more broadly,
since IG is concerned with favourable responses generally rather than,
as R is, with the performance of acts in particular, and also since,
as just noted, IG is concerned with prima facie rightness generally
rather than, as R is, with overall rightness in particular.) Jonathan
Dancy characterizes this form of consequentialism as the thesis that
all moral reasons are ‘value-involving’.15 The idea is that, since IG
asserts an identity between something’s being intrinsically good and
there being a reason to favour it, it implies not only that wherever there
is value there is a reason to respond favourably, but also that wherever
there is a reason to respond favourably there is value. Deontologists
have typically resisted the latter claim. Dancy thus argues that
IG ‘threatens’ to resolve the debate between consequentialists and
deontologists in favour of consequentialism.
This argument can be resisted. Consider the moral theory advocated
by W. D. Ross in The Right and the Good. According to Ross, we have
a number of prima facie moral duties or obligations, i.e. a number
of different moral reasons to act in various ways. He says that it
is prima facie morally obligatory to (a) fulfil one’s commitments, (b)
make reparation for past wrongdoing, (c) display gratitude for benefits
received, (d) distribute goods justly, (e) act beneficently towards others,
(f) act beneficently towards oneself and (g) refrain from maleficence
towards others.16 At one point he explicitly groups duties (d)–(f)
together and says that they all come under the general principle that
combination collapses the distinction between what is optimific and what is optimizing,
since according to hedonism acts themselves can have no (or can at best have neutral)
intrinsic value. Moore then goes on to entertain a number of objections to utilitarianism.
He in effect divides these objections into two classes: those that target consequentialism,
and those that target hedonism. He rebuts all of the former and continues to embrace
consequentialism. However, he accepts certain objections to hedonism, and so ends
up rejecting utilitarianism. He fails to note, however, that the rejection of hedonism
resurrects the distinction between what is optimific and what is optimizing, and as
a consequence, in equating what is overall morally right with what is optimific, he
misrepresents his own account of the conditions of such rightness. This is something
that Broad brings out in Broad, ‘Certain Features’, p. 50, and Moore accepts the criticism
in G. E. Moore, ‘A Reply to My Critics’, The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, ed. P. A. Schilpp
(Evanston, 1942), pp. 559–60.
(Having noted this, I should also note that in Ethics Moore nonetheless does in another
way significantly modify his understanding of the relation between what is overall
morally right and what is best. In Principia Ethica, he claims that doing what is overall
morally right is to be analysed in terms of doing what is best; this thesis is captured by
R. In Ethics, he claims only that the former is strictly equivalent to the latter. He gives
his reasons for making this move in Moore, ‘Reply’, pp. 558–9.)
15 Dancy, ‘Should We’, p. 168.
16 W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford, 2002 [originally published in 1930]),
p. 21.
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‘we should produce as much good as possible’,17 but he explicitly denies
that duties (a)–(c) fall within the ambit of this general obligation. Ross,
then, would reject the claim that all prima facie duties are value-
involving and thus deny that his theory reduces to consequentialism.
Is he thereby committed to rejecting IG?
Perhaps not. It seems to me that Ross could, consistently with his
theory, accept IG if he made one of the following two moves.18 He could
interpret IG as follows:
IG1: x is intrinsically good = df. there is some limited set of kinds of
favourable responses such that anyone who is aware of x has a moral
reason to make some such kind of response towards x for its own
sake.
The underlying idea here is that intrinsic value does not simply call for
just any kind of positive response; it calls for a positive response of some
particular kind or kinds.19 For example, it might be said that what is
intrinsically good warrants ‘promoting’ for its own sake, whereas what
we have reason to do when, for example, we have made a promise is not
to ‘promote’ fidelity but rather to ‘exhibit’ it. Alternatively, Ross could
interpret IG as follows:
IG2: x is intrinsically good = df. there is some limited set of kinds of
moral reasons such that anyone who is aware of x has a moral reason
of some such kind to favour x for its own sake.
The underlying idea here is that there are not just different moral
reasons (e.g. reasons to fulfil one’s commitments, reasons to act
beneficently, and so on) but different kinds of moral reasons to behave
in various ways, and that only some of these kinds of reasons are value-
involving.20
I am not endorsing (or rejecting) either of these moves. To evaluate
them, it would be helpful to have some story about the different kinds
of responses or reasons that are supposed to be at issue, and of why
these kinds have a tie to intrinsic value that other kinds do not, and I
am not sure just how such a story might go. I mean only to point out
17 Ross, The Right, p. 27. It is surprising to me that (d) is said to fall under this principle,
and also that (g) is not said to.
18 Such moves are discussed in J. Olson, ‘Buck-Passing and the Consequential-
ism/Deontology Distinction’, forthcoming.
19 Crisp reports in R. Crisp, ‘Value, Reasons and the Structure of Justification: How
to Avoid Passing the Buck’, Analysis 65 (2005), p. 83, that Scanlon intended something
along these lines.
20 Dancy reports in Dancy, ‘Should We’, p. 168, n. 4, that Derek Parfit made a suggestion
along these lines. It may be that what Scanlon intended is something along these lines
in addition to, or instead of, the lines of IG1 (on which, see the last note).
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that there does seem to be some conceptual room to manoeuvre here,
and that we should therefore not rush to the conclusion that IG implies
that some form of consequentialism is true.
IV
Whether IG implies that some form of consequentialism is true seems
to me not so important as whether it itself is true. Should we accept it?
Scanlon believes so. What he says is this:
We judge things to be good or valuable because of other properties that they
have. Often these are physical or psychological properties, as, for example, when
we judge something to be good because it is pleasant, or judge a discovery to be
valuable because it provides new understanding of how cancer cells develop.
But being good or valuable cannot be identified with any such ‘natural’ property
or, more generally, with any non-normative property. This is the lesson of the
open-question argument . . .
But even if being valuable cannot be identified with any set of natural
properties, it remains true that a thing’s having these properties can be grounds
for concluding that it is valuable. What, then, are the relations between these
natural properties, the property of being valuable, and the reasons that we have
for behaving in certain ways in regard to things that are valuable? There seem
to be two possibilities. The first is that when something has the right natural
properties it has the further property of being valuable, and that property
gives us reason to behave or react in certain ways with regard to it . . . The
alternative, which I believe to be correct, is to hold that being good, or valuable,
is not a property that itself provides a reason to respond to a thing in certain
ways. Rather, to be good or valuable is to have other properties that constitute
such reasons . . . Since the claim that some property constitutes a reason is a
normative claim, this account also takes goodness and value to be non-natural
properties, namely the purely formal, higher-order properties of having some
lower-order properties that provide reasons of the relevant kind. It differs from
the first alternative simply in holding that it is not goodness or value itself that
provides reasons but rather other properties that do so. For this reason I call
it a buck-passing account.
Buck-passing accounts of goodness and value are supported in two ways by
intuitions about the reasons we have to choose, prefer, recommend, and admire
things that are valuable. First, when I consider particular cases it seems that
these reasons are provided by the natural properties that make a thing good or
valuable. So, for example, the fact that a resort is pleasant is a reason to visit it
or to recommend it to a friend, and the fact that a discovery casts light on the
causes of cancer is a reason to applaud it and to support further research of that
kind. These natural properties provide a complete explanation of the reasons
we have for reacting in these ways to things that are good or valuable. It is not
clear what further work could be done by special reason-providing properties
of goodness and value, and even less clear how these properties could provide
reasons.
A second source of support for a buck-passing account is the fact that many
different things can be said to be good or to be valuable, and the grounds
for these judgments vary widely. There does not seem to be a single, reason-
providing property that is common to all these cases . . .
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I therefore accept buck-passing accounts of both goodness and value.21
This is a long and complex passage. I think it is pretty clear what
Scanlon’s view of goodness is. What is not so clear (to me) is just why
he holds this view, and it is for this reason that I have quoted him at
length: my doing so should help you judge whether what I say below
misrepresents his position in any way.
Before I lay out what I take to be Scanlon’s view of goodness, let me
note a complication concerning his use of the terms ‘good’ and ‘valuable’
in the quoted passage. He starts by saying, ‘We judge things to be good
or valuable . . .’, thereby indicating that he already accepts
G: x is good = df. x is valuable.
This impression is reinforced when he continues, ‘But being good or
valuable cannot be identified with any such “natural” property . . . .’
Remember also, from Section II above, that Scanlon gives the following
account of what it is for something to be valuable: ‘To claim that
something is valuable . . . is to claim that others have reason to value
it, as you do.’22 This suggests that he begins by accepting, more
particularly,
G2: x is good = df. there is a reason to favour x.
But, of course, the question at issue is whether G2 is true; presuming
its truth at the outset is not a good way to argue for its truth. This
problem is heightened when, in the second paragraph, Scanlon drops
his reference to goodness and talks only in terms of valuableness. He
distinguishes two views regarding ‘the relations between [(a)] these
natural properties, [(b)] the property of being valuable [note: here he
does not say, “the property of being good”], and [(c)] the reasons that
we have for behaving in certain ways in regard to things that are
valuable [note again: he does not say, “things that are good”].’ He
then characterizes the first view, which he rejects, as follows: ‘when
something has [(a)] the right natural properties it has [(b)] the further
property of being valuable [note once again: he does not say “good”], and
that property [i.e. valuableness] gives us [(c)] reason to behave or react
in certain ways with regard to it . . . ’. But of course this is a crazy view,
if we accept, as I suggest and Scanlon indicates, that for something to
be valuable is for it to be such that we have a reason to value (i.e. to
favour) it. On this understanding, the view that he is attacking is the
view that something’s being such that we have a reason to favour it
gives us – that is, presumably, either grounds our having or explains
our having – a reason to favour it. But who would want to say this?
21 Scanlon, What We Owe, pp. 96–8.
22 Scanlon, What We Owe, p. 95.
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Who (apart, perhaps, from some theologians) would ever want to say
that it is possible that x’s being F grounds or explains x’s being F?
In order to avoid prejudging the question at issue, I therefore propose
that we couch it in the following terms: what is the relation between
(a) something’s having some natural property, (b) its being good and (c)
its being valuable (i.e. its being such that we have a reason to favour
it)? The two views that Scanlon discusses are these:
View 1: (a) grounds (b), which grounds (c).
View 2: (a) grounds (b), which is identical with (c).
View 2 is the buck-passing account, which of course constitutes an
endorsement of
G: x is good = df. x is valuable.
Before examining Scanlon’s reasons for accepting View 2, let me
briefly attend to some further complications. First, Scanlon moves in
the quoted passage from talk (in the second paragraph) of a buck-
passing account (singular) of goodness and value, to talk (in the third
paragraph) of buck-passing accounts (plural), back to talk (in the
fourth paragraph) of a buck-passing account, back to talk (in the final
paragraph) of buck-passing accounts. The singular talk suggests that
he identifies goodness with value, whereas the plural talk suggests that
he distinguishes between goodness and value. I do not think we should
take the plural talk seriously; I will assume that Scanlon is proposing
just one buck-passing account of goodness, i.e. of value.23
A second complication is that the buck-passing account that Scanlon
embraces is slightly more detailed than my statement of View 2 reveals.
What he actually says is that (b) something’s being good is identical
with (c′) its being such that its having some natural property (i.e. its
being such that (a) is true of it) provides a reason to favour it.
A third complication is that Scanlon has said that he did not intend to
commit himself to the claim that such reason-providers must in every
case be restricted to natural properties. He concedes that they may
sometimes involve certain evaluative properties that are more specific
than the general property of goodness.24 This raises difficulties that I
will not address here.
23 Thus G could be equally well rendered as
x has value = df. x is valuable
or as
x is of value = df. x is valuable.
See n. 3 above.
24 See T. M. Scanlon, ‘Reasons, Responsibility, and Reliance: Replies to Wallace,
Dworkin, and Deigh’, Ethics 112 (2002), p. 513.
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A final complication is that the natural properties that Scanlon cites
as illustrations of what might ground goodness or valuableness are
ill suited to a discussion of intrinsic goodness in particular, which, as
I have said, is the kind of goodness on which I wish to concentrate
here. He talks of something’s being good because it is pleasant, and
of a discovery’s being valuable because it provides new understanding
of how cancer cells develop. In each case, it would seem implausible
to ascribe intrinsic value to that which is said to be good or valuable.
There is some plausibility to saying that pleasure and understanding
are intrinsically good, but this would only warrant ascribing extrinsic
value to that which is pleasant or provides understanding.
In order to focus on intrinsic value, let us suppose for the sake
of illustration that pleasure is intrinsically good, that is, that states
consisting of someone’s being pleased are intrinsically good. Consider
some such state, x. Let ‘P’ stand for x’s being a state of pleasure, ‘G’ for
x’s being intrinsically good and ‘V’ for x’s being intrinsically valuable
(i.e. for x’s being such that anyone who is aware of it has a moral
reason to favour it for its own sake). (Although the distinction between
the ‘requirement’ and ‘requirer’ senses of ‘reason’ will come into play
later, we need not worry about it at this stage, given the fact, noted
above, that there is no requirement without a requirer and no requirer
without a requirement. For present purposes, we can understand ‘V’ as
standing for x’s being such that anyone who is aware of it is morally
required by some fact about it to favour it for its own sake.) Let ‘↑’
signify the grounding relation and ‘=’ signify the relation of identity.
(The grounding relation is the inverse of supervenience; if x’s being F
grounds x’s being H, then x’s being H supervenes on x’s being F.) View
1 gives us the following picture of the relation between P, G and V:
Picture 1: V
↑
G
↑
P
View 2, which incorporates IG, gives us the following picture of this
relation:
Picture 2: G = V
↑
P
Scanlon opts for View 2/Picture 2 over View 1/Picture 1. Why? He gives
two arguments, which Roger Crisp has dubbed the Redundancy Argu-
ment and the Argument from Pluralism.25 Let us consider them in turn.
25 Crisp, ‘Value’, p. 81.
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The Redundancy Argument is contained in the third paragraph of
the passage quoted above. It is not clear to me just what the argument
is supposed to be. Here is one possible reconstruction (when applied to
a supposed instance of intrinsic value):
RA1:
Suppose
1. x is a state of pleasure.
2. Whatever is a state of pleasure is intrinsically good.
Therefore
3. x is intrinsically good.
4. Whatever is intrinsically good is intrinsically valuable.
Therefore
5. x is intrinsically valuable.
6. x’s being a state of pleasure fully explains x’s being intrinsically
valuable.
7. If x’s being a state of pleasure fully explains x’s being intrinsically
valuable, then x’s being intrinsically good does not also explain x’s
being intrinsically valuable.
8. If x’s being intrinsically good does not explain x’s being intrinsically
valuable, then x’s being intrinsically good does not ground x’s being
intrinsically valuable.
9. If x’s being intrinsically good does not ground x’s being intrinsically
valuable, then View 1/Picture 1 is false.
10. If View 1/Picture 1 is false, then View 2/Picture 2 is true.
Therefore 11. View 2/Picture 2 is true.
I find this argument unpersuasive. I will not quarrel with any of
steps 1–5. The hedonistic judgement expressed in premiss 2 may be
too sweeping, but it is made solely for the sake of illustration and is
not essential to the argument. Someone might well balk at premiss 4,
especially since I have said that ‘valuable’ is to be construed in terms of
what there is a moral reason to favour. But in fact, as noted in Section
II, the reason’s being a moral one is not essential to the argument, so
long as it is recognized as a normative reason of some sort. Moreover,
premiss 4, so understood, is endorsed by both Picture 1 and Picture 2
and so does not itself favour either picture over the other.
The trouble begins with premiss 6. Scanlon claims that x’s natural
properties ‘provide a complete explanation’ of the reason we have to
favour x. In the preceding paragraph he claims that these properties
‘can be grounds for concluding’ that x is valuable. I think these
expressions may be regarded as equivalent. What, though, of the
claim (suggested by Scanlon’s talk of lower-order properties ‘providing
reasons’ to behave in certain ways) that x’s natural properties ‘ground’
x’s being valuable? There is a distinction between saying, on the one
hand, that x’s being F is grounds for concluding that x is H and saying,
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on the other, that x’s being F grounds x’s being H. The latter concerns a
purely ontological relation, whereas the former concerns an ontological-
cum-epistemological relation.
Consider Picture 2. According to that picture, x’s being a state of
pleasure (P) grounds its being intrinsically good (G). Of course, P also
grounds x’s being intrinsically valuable (V), since on this picture G is
identical with V. But does P provide an adequate explanation of either G
or V? This is not so obvious. Suppose that Jane is aware that, in general,
something’s being a state of pleasure grounds its being intrinsically
good but not that its being intrinsically good is identical with its being
intrinsically valuable. Then pointing out to her that P is the case will
serve to explain to her how it is that G is the case but not how it is
that V is the case. You might reply that P is nonetheless grounds for
Jane’s concluding that V is the case, whether or not she is aware of this.
But that may not be so. Whether something is grounds for someone’s
reaching some conclusion is a function of that person’s evidence, and it
may be that Jane has no evidence that something’s being intrinsically
good is identical with its being intrinsically valuable.
Now consider Picture 1. According to that picture, P grounds G, which
in turn grounds V. The grounding relation is transitive. It thus follows
that P grounds V. Suppose that Jane has evidence that P grounds G
but not that G grounds V. Then pointing out to her that P is the case
will explain how it is that G is the case but not how it is that V is the
case.
Return now to premiss 6 of RA1. I find it tendentious. Even if it is
agreed that P grounds V, there is no reason to think that everyone is
so situated epistemically that the former explains the latter. (For this
reason, premiss 8 is also suspect.) But let us put this aside. Suppose we
restrict our attention to people who are ideally situated epistemically,
and so grant premiss 6, and that we now turn our attention to premiss
7. I see no reason to accept this premiss. Consider Picture 1. Suppose
that Jane is aware that in general something’s being a state of pleasure
grounds its being intrinsically good, which in turn grounds its being
intrinsically valuable, and that therefore something’s being a state of
pleasure grounds its being intrinsically valuable. Then pointing out to
her that P is the case will fully explain how it is that V is the case,
but this does not mean that G does not also explain V. On the contrary,
G will also fully explain V, in that citing the former will under the
circumstances suffice for Jane’s concluding the latter.
You may object that what I have just said misuses the expression
‘fully explain’, in that there cannot be more than one ‘full’ explanation
of some fact. But if that is so, we must reject premiss 6 after all, even
on the supposition that we are dealing with people who are ideally
situated epistemically. For there is no reason to think that, on either
Picture 1 or Picture 2, P represents the most fundamental ontological
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ground that is implicitly ‘at work’ in the picture. On the contrary, there
is good reason to think otherwise. Presumably, P will itself supervene
on some neurophysiological fact, N, that would serve to explain, to
anyone in the appropriate epistemic position, how it is that P is the
case. Thus if we are required to ‘pass the buck’ on from G to P, in
light of G’s failure to give a ‘full’ explanation of V, we must pass it on
yet again from P to N. But this is not in keeping with Scanlon’s own
examples. These examples strongly suggest that he takes the buck to
stop with the higher-level natural properties that he cites; he gives
no indication that he would pass it on to whatever lower-level natural
properties ground these higher-level properties. I can see no rationale
for stopping at such a mid-way point. More importantly, and to repeat
my main point, tracing the explanation of V to some natural ground
such as P (or N) does not preclude G’s being a ground of V and thus
playing a role in the explanation of V.26
I conclude that at least one of premisses 6, 7 and 8 is false and that
RA1 is therefore unsound. Perhaps it is also worth noting that premiss
10 is false. (Premiss 9 is clearly true.) There are, after all, other pictures
concerning the relation between P, G and V that might be considered.
Here are some:
Picture 3: G Picture 4: G V
↑ ↖ ↗
V P
↑
P
Picture 5: V Picture 6: V
↑ ↗ ↖
P = G P G
26 In private communication, Jonas Olson and Robert Pulvertaft have suggested the
following rationale for having the buck stop at P and thus for not passing it on to N:
V (or G) supervenes necessarily on P, but P supervenes only contingently on N. That
is, whereas V (or G) obtains in all possible worlds in which P obtains, there are some
worlds (presumably worlds with psychophysical laws different from those that obtain in
the actual world) in which N obtains but P does not. P thus provides all the explanation
of V (or G) that is needed, whereas N does not. For this reason the buck stops at P and
does not pass on to N.
My response: presumably there is some fact X (a complex fact that comprises the
psychophysical laws that obtain in the actual world) such that P supervenes necessarily
on (N & X). There is no good reason, then, for the buck to stop at P; even if it does not
pass on to N, it must at least pass on to (N & X).
Olson has responded in turn: it is conceivable that P supervene on nothing at all; that
is why the buck stops at P.
My response to this: I grant that it is conceivable that P not supervene on any
neurophysiological fact; I am not so sure that it is conceivable that P supervene on
nothing at all. But even if this is conceivable, so what? Surely we should not require of
all value-grounding facts that they be such that they can obtain ungrounded. That would
be too demanding; it would preclude many alleged grounds of value (such as knowledge
and understanding) from being such grounds.
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Still, I will not pursue this point, for two reasons. First, I find no
reason to endorse any of these other pictures. Second, in the quoted
passage Scanlon merely claims to provide reasons in ‘support’ of the
buck-passing account, and so premiss 10 may oversimplify his position.
RA1 constitutes just one way to construe Scanlon’s Redundancy
Argument. When discussing this argument, Dancy indicates that he
finds in it a key idea that does not appear in RA1. When commenting
on two views, the second of which is the view that I have called View 1
and depicted in Picture 1, Dancy says:
We abandon the second view because we recognise immediately that the
badness of a toothache, for example, does not add a further reason to the
reasons for going to the dentist that are already given by the nature of the
toothache, its painfulness. As we might put it, the badness of the toothache
exists in virtue of certain features, features which give us reason to act in
certain ways; the badness of the ache adds nothing to the reasons given us by
those lower-level features. In short, value adds no reasons to those generated
by the ground for that value.27
In saying this, Dancy evidently takes himself to be endorsing something
in Scanlon’s Redundancy Argument, since he shortly goes on to say:
‘Remember that we agreed with Scanlon that the badness of the pain
cannot add to the reasons generated by the features that make the pain
bad . . .’.28 Dancy seems to be supposing that, when Scanlon says that
the pertinent natural properties provide a ‘complete explanation’ of the
reasons we have for favouring something that is good, and that the
goodness of the thing therefore does no ‘further work’ in providing such
reasons, he is thereby invoking the idea that goodness adds no reasons
to those generated by the natural properties in question. Now, I am not
sure that this is Scanlon’s intention but, if it is, then his argument is not
properly represented by RA1 and requires a different reconstruction.
But what reconstruction?
At this point, the ambiguity between the ‘requirement’ and ‘requirer’
senses of ‘reason’ becomes relevant. Much of what Scanlon says
suggests that he is invoking the former sense. He talks repeatedly
of natural properties ‘providing’ reasons to respond in certain ways
and also of their ‘providing an explanation’ of these reasons. (Dancy
talks similarly of such properties ‘giving’ or ‘generating’ reasons to act.)
Such talk strongly suggests that the properties are one thing and the
reasons are another. This seems to be good evidence that Scanlon takes
reasons to be requirements to behave in certain ways, requirements
that are grounded in the natural properties in question. Yet Scanlon
also talks at times of natural properties as ‘constituting’ reasons, and
27 Dancy, ‘Should We’, p. 164.
28 Dancy, ‘Should We’, p. 165; emphasis added.
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this might seem to suggest that such properties are themselves reasons
to respond in certain ways. So construed, reasons are requirers rather
than requirements. Moreover, it is clearly the ‘requirer’ sense that
Scanlon has in mind when he says that the fact that a resort is pleasant
is a reason to visit it, and the fact that a discovery casts light on the
causes of cancer is a reason to applaud it.
In light of this ambiguity, two distinct reconstructions of Scanlon’s
Redundancy Argument (construed in light of Dancy’s observation about
value giving us no further reason(s) to act beyond the reason(s)
generated by the ground for that value) emerge, one couched in the
‘requirement’ sense of ‘reason’, the other in the ‘requirer’ sense. In the
‘requirement’ sense, Scanlon’s argument may be put as follows (when
applied, once again, to a supposed instance of intrinsic value):
RA2:
1–6. [same as steps 1–6 of RA1]
7. If x’s being intrinsically good also explained x’s being intrinsically
valuable, then x’s being intrinsically good would provide an
additional explanation of x’s being intrinsically valuable.
8. If x’s being intrinsically good provided an additional explanation
of x’s being intrinsically valuable, then x’s being intrinsically good
would add to the reason, i.e. would strengthen the requirement, for
anyone who is aware of x to favour x for its own sake.
But
9. x’s being intrinsically good does not add to the reason (already
provided by x’s natural properties – in particular, by x’s being a state
of pleasure) to favour x for its own sake.
Therefore
10. x’s being intrinsically good does not explain x’s being intrinsically
valuable.
11–14. [same as steps 8–11 of RA1]
When understood in terms of the ‘requirer’ sense of ‘reason’, Scanlon’s
argument may be put as follows:
RA3:
1–6. [same as steps 1–6 of RA1]
7. If x’s being intrinsically good also explained x’s being intrinsically
valuable, then x’s being intrinsically good would provide an
additional explanation of x’s being intrinsically valuable.
8. If x’s being intrinsically good provided an additional explanation
of x’s being intrinsically valuable, then x’s being intrinsically good
would add to the reasons for, i.e. would be an additional ground that
requires, anyone who is aware of x to favour x for its own sake.
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But
9. x’s being intrinsically good does not add to the reasons (already
constituted by x’s natural properties) to favour x for its own sake.
Therefore 10. x’s being intrinsically good does not explain x’s being
intrinsically valuable.
11–14. [same as steps 8–11 of RA1]
In both RA2 and RA3, it is of course premiss 9 that is intended to give
expression to the key idea, which Dancy ascribes to Scanlon, that values
are redundant in the sense that they add no reason(s) not already
furnished by their grounds.
Each of RA2 and RA3 inherits some of the problems of RA1, in
that some of the troublesome premisses in RA1 (namely, 6, 8 and 10)
reappear in RA2 and RA3 (as premisses 6, 11 and 13 – the problems
arise, regardless of whether ‘reason’ is interpreted in the ‘requirement’
or ‘requirer’ sense, which is why I did not attend to this distinction
when discussing RA1). But each also faces an additional problem.
Consider RA2 first. Its premiss 8 is simply false. It is of course the
case that on Picture 1 there are more grounds than on Picture 2 for
the requirement to favour x for its own sake. But this gives us no
reason whatsoever to think that Picture 1 implies that the requirement
in question is somehow amplified. As noted in Section II above, the
strength of a requirement is strictly independent of the number of its
grounds. It would be absurd to think that the badness of a toothache
somehow amplifies the (prudential) requirement, already provided by
its painfulness, to go to the dentist. But, again, Picture 1 entails no
such absurdity.
Now consider RA3. Its premiss 8 is unexceptionable (as long as
one recognizes that adding grounds for a requirement does not entail
strengthening the requirement). But now premiss 9 – Dancy’s key
claim – is problematic. Why agree that G constitutes no ground for
the requirement contained in V beyond that constituted by P? Perhaps
the idea is that, if G were to constitute such a ground, it would have
to do so independently of P. But that is not the case. Picture 1 is not
Picture 6. According to the latter picture, G is a ground for V that is
separate from P. I think we can agree that there is no good reason to
accept this picture. But Picture 1 is quite different. According to it,
P grounds V by way of G (just as the neurophysiological property N
grounds V by way of P). Premiss 9 of RA3 simply begs the question
against the proponent of View 1/Picture 1.
I conclude that Scanlon’s Redundancy Argument is unsuccessful.
What about his Argument from Pluralism? This can be dealt with much
more briefly. As I see it, the following is what he has in mind (when
applied to intrinsic value):
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AP:
1. There are many different kinds of things (e.g. states of pleasure,
beauty, and knowledge) that are intrinsically good.
2. Whatever is intrinsically good is intrinsically valuable.
Therefore
3. There are many different kinds of things that are intrinsically
valuable.
4. If there are many different kinds of things that are intrinsically
valuable, then there are many different kinds of grounds for things’
being intrinsically valuable – that is, the grounds for some things’
being intrinsically valuable are distinct in kind from the grounds for
other things’ being intrinsically valuable.
5. If the grounds for some things’ being intrinsically valuable are
distinct in kind from the grounds for other things’ being intrinsically
valuable, then being intrinsically good is not the only kind of ground
for things’ being intrinsically valuable.
Therefore
6. Being intrinsically good is not the only kind of ground for
things’ being intrinsically valuable.
7. If being intrinsically good is not the only kind of ground for things’
being intrinsically valuable, then View 1/Picture 1 is false.
8. If View 1/Picture 1 is false, then View 2/Picture 2 is true.
Therefore 9. View 2/Picture 2 is true.
I find this argument just as unpersuasive as the other(s), even if we
grant (as I suspect we should) the pluralism contained in steps 1–3,
and even if we overlook the oversimplification contained in premiss 8.
First, premiss 4 is tendentious. We have been given no reason to think
that, just because there are many different kinds of things that have
intrinsic value, a thing’s being intrinsically valuable cannot in every
case be attributed to its being intrinsically good. Picture 1 is, after all,
perfectly compatible with the following pictures (where ‘B’ stands for
x’s being a state of beauty, and ‘K’ for x’s being a state of knowledge):
Picture 7: V Picture 8: V
↑ ↑
G G
↑ ↑
B K
Second, even if premiss 4 is granted and hence its proximate conclusion,
6, is too (for there is no doubting premiss 5), this does nothing to impugn
View 1, since premiss 7 is false. The reason for this is the same as that
given earlier when discussing the Redundancy Argument: to claim that
a thing’s being intrinsically good is not the sole ground for its being
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intrinsically valuable is not to claim that the former is not a ground for
the latter.
V
The verdict on View 2/Picture 2 thus remains open. We have not yet
been given sufficient reason to prefer it to View 1/Picture 1. Are there
any other considerations that might help tip the balance one way or
the other?
One consideration is simply that of simplicity. Someone might say:
Picture 2 is simpler than Picture 1; hence Picture 2 is to be preferred.
The problem with this proposal is that simplicity is surely at best
a tie-breaker: all else being equal, a simpler view is perhaps to be
preferred to a more complicated one, but not necessarily otherwise. Of
course, the question is whether all else is equal in this context.
Another consideration concerns the relation between goodness and
valuableness. The idea that something’s being intrinsically good is
equivalent to its being intrinsically valuable is very attractive. Someone
might say: Picture 2 captures this idea, whereas Picture 1 does not;
hence Picture 2 is to be preferred.
The problem with this proposal is that it misrepresents Picture 1, in
that this picture can accommodate the idea in question, which I agree
is very attractive.29 It is true that Picture 1 is incompatible with
IG: x is intrinsically good = df. anyone who is aware of x has a moral
reason to favour it for its own sake,
since Picture 1 depicts V as supervenient on, rather than as identical
with, G, whereas Picture 2 of course endorses IG. But Picture 1 is
perfectly compatible with a thesis that is slightly weaker than IG,
namely,
IG∗: necessarily, x is intrinsically good iff anyone who is aware of x
has a moral reason to favour it for its own sake,
and this thesis gives full expression to the idea at issue.
A third consideration concerns the following thesis:
29 Some philosophers have argued that the idea should be rejected, claiming that it is
possible that something be intrinsically valuable without being intrinsically good. See
e.g. B. Blanshard, Reason and Goodness (London, 1961), pp. 287–9; W. Rabinowicz and
T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, ‘The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-Attitudes and Value’,
Ethics, 114 (2004). I believe these arguments fail, but I will not pursue the issue here. I
suppose that someone might also argue that it is possible that something be intrinsically
good without being intrinsically valuable, on the grounds that, to have a reason to behave
in some way (e.g. to favour something), one must be motivated to do so, and it is possible
that someone be aware of something intrinsically good without being motivated to favour
it. I believe that this argument fails, too, but again I will not pursue the issue here.
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(1) if x is intrinsically good, then anyone who is aware of x has a
moral reason to favour it for its own sake because it is intrinsically
good.
Someone might say: (1) is true; Picture 1 accommodates this thesis,
whereas Picture 2 does not; hence Picture 1 is to be preferred.30
I find this a very difficult matter. I think there is no denying
that thesis (1) strikes many, myself included, as intuitively plausible,
whereas its near-converse
(2) if x is intrinsically good, then x is intrinsically good because anyone
who is aware of x has a moral reason to favour it for its own sake31
strikes no one as plausible. But what are we to make of this?
Proponents of IG/View 2/Picture 2 have tended simply to deny that
(1) is true, pointing to the fact that whatever natural properties x has
fully account for the reason to favour it.32 But we have been through
all of that: in whatever sense x’s natural properties fully account for
the reason to favour it, their doing so does not preclude its goodness
from also providing such an account. Of course, this last point does not
show that (1) is true, but if, as IG asserts, goodness and valuableness
are the same thing, why should (1) strike so many as plausible whereas
(2) does not?
One answer, suggested by Ewing, is this: there can sometimes be
a reason to favour x in one way because there is already a reason to
favour it in some other way. (For example, perhaps something is the
sort of thing that we ought to pursue because it is the sort of thing
that we ought to welcome if attained.) The latter reason constitutes x’s
goodness, and so we can indeed say in such a case that there is a reason
(i.e. the former reason) to favour x because x is good.33 Now, presumably
such a chain of reasons can arise, but noting this fact does nothing to
allay the sense that (1) is true in all cases in which something has
intrinsic value, and thus that there is a reason to favour x in the first
place (i.e. that the latter reason exists) because x is good.
Another answer is that, although analyses such as IG assert
an identity between analysandum and analysans, they nonetheless
involve an asymmetry between the former and the latter;34 and it is,
or at least can on occasion be, correct to say that the analysans is true
30 See Blanshard, Reason, pp. 284–6. Compare W. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics
(Oxford, 1939), pp. 278–9, although Ross obscures the issue by failing to distinguish
the various senses of the verb ‘to value’ noted in Section II above.
31 This thesis is depicted in Picture 3 above.
32 In addition to Scanlon’s Redundancy Argument, see Ewing, Definition, pp. 157 and
172. Compare N. Lemos, Intrinsic Value (Cambridge, 1994), p. 19.
33 See Ewing, Second Thoughts, p. 100.
34 How analyses manage to combine these features is of course a vexed issue.
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because the analysandum is. Suppose, for example, that two people
are discussing something that they both recognize to be a circle. One
of them asserts that the circle is equidistant at all points from some
fixed point; the other expresses doubts about this. The first then says,
‘Look, it’s equidistant at all points from some fixed point because it’s a
circle. That’s just what it is to be a circle.’35 If this sort of statement
is coherent, and if it is this sort of ‘because’ that is at issue in (1),
then we have an explanation both of how (1) does not threaten IG/View
2/Picture 2 after all and of why (2) does not have the same plausibility
as (1).
I doubt, however, that it is this sort of ‘because’ that is at issue in
the claim under discussion. The explanation just given about what it is
to be a circle presupposes that the person to whom it is offered fails to
recognize that something’s being a circle requires that it be equidistant
at all points from some fixed point. But this sort of ignorance is precisely
not what is at issue in the present case. Someone (like me) might
acknowledge
IG∗: necessarily, x is intrinsically good iff anyone who is aware of x
has a moral reason to favour it for its own sake,
and still claim that something’s being good explains why there is a
reason to favour it. Indeed, there seems to be some pressure to say that
a thing’s evaluative properties provide a better or deeper explanation
than its non-evaluative properties do of why there is a reason to respond
to it in some way. Consider the following remark by Crisp:
When I look at Piero della Francesca’s Madonna, I see it as a good or beautiful
painting. I recognize that it has certain natural, non-evaluative properties, and
that its beauty depends on its having those properties. And, of course, I see it as
an artefact to be admired. But the reason for admiration lies not in the natural
properties – these could be understood by someone with no aesthetic sense –
but in the beauty.36
Here, I take ‘the reason for admiration’ to refer to that which explains,
rather than simply grounds, the fact that the painting is fit to
be admired. After all, presumably the non-evaluative properties in
question do ground the painting’s beauty and, thereby, its being fit to
be admired. Something similar might be said about the case depicted
in Picture 1: although P grounds G and thereby also grounds V, it is G
that provides the better or deeper explanation of V.
How might we account for this? Here is one attempt. G is a better
explanation of V than P is because (a) V would still be the case, as long
as G was, even if P were not the case, whereas (b) V would not still be
the case, if G were not, even if P were still the case.
35 This illustration is borrowed from Zimmerman, Nature, p. 115.
36 Crisp, ‘Value’, p. 82.
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But I think this is hopeless. First, (a) provides no support for Picture 1
over Picture 2; the value-pluralism to which it gives implicit expression
is as compatible with the latter as with the former. Second, given that
P does indeed ground G, (b) constitutes, as I see it, a counterfactual
with an impossible antecedent, and I have no idea whether such
counterfactuals are meaningful and, if so, how they should be handled.
Third, even if (b) is meaningful, it too seems not to favour Picture 1
over Picture 2. In short, even if (a) and (b) are true, they do not
appear to entail that G explains V, let alone that it does so better than
P does.
Here is another attempt. Consider again Pictures 1, 7 and 8:
Picture 1: V Picture 7: V Picture 8: V
↑ ↑ ↑
G G G
↑ ↑ ↑
P B K
Not only are these pictures, as noted earlier, compatible with one
another, but they clearly have something in common. In each case,
G grounds V, even though what grounds G differs from case to case. G
is thus a better explanation of V than either P, B or K is, because it has
greater generality.
I am not sure what to make of this argument. Compare the following
pictures:
Picture 2: G = V Picture 9: G = V Picture 10: G = V
↑ ↑ ↑
P B K
These pictures also clearly have something in common: in each case, G
is identical with V, even though what grounds G differs from case to
case. Why should we prefer the first set of pictures (Pictures 1, 7 and 8)
to the second (Pictures 2, 9 and 10)? Embracing either set commits one
to value-pluralism. In the second set, no explanation is given of how it is
that V (= G) can supervene on a plurality of natural grounds (P, B and
K). In the first set, although V supervenes in each case on a common
ground (G), no explanation is given of how G itself can supervene on a
plurality of natural grounds (P, B and K). How then does the generality
of G as an (alleged) explanation of V render it a better explanation,
when its grounds are as disparate in the first set of pictures as in the
second? Perhaps there is a good answer to this question, but I do not
know what it might be.
Here is a final attempt. Return to Crisp’s illustration. He notes that
someone might recognize all the pertinent natural properties of the
Madonna but, lacking any aesthetic sense, not recognize its beauty
and so not recognize how it is fit to be admired. Similarly, someone
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might recognize that P is the case but, lacking any moral sense, not
recognize that G is the case and so not recognize how it is that V is the
case. However, someone who recognizes the beauty of the Madonna,
but is unable to identify precisely the underlying natural properties in
virtue of which it is beautiful, can nonetheless recognize how it is that
it is fit to be admired. Similarly (although the simplicity of the example
makes this harder to imagine), someone who recognizes that G is the
case, but is unable to identify P as the underlying natural ground of
G, can nonetheless recognize how it is that V is the case. Now, this
observation does not by itself favour Picture 1 over Picture 2, since
someone who subscribes to IG can acknowledge the possibility that
someone recognize that ‘both’ G and V are the case without recognizing
that P is the case. Thus the observation does not itself show that G
explains V, let alone that G explains V better than P does. Nonetheless,
it is suggestive.
Compare the following example of causal explanation. Imagine that
we have a glass container, x, and some boiling water, and that pouring
the boiling water into x (W) causes x’s cracking (C). Presumably, W
supervenes on certain microphysical facts and events (M) that are
causally sufficient for C. But that does not render W causally irrelevant
to C. On the contrary, W explains C. Indeed, there is reason to think
that W explains C better than M does, since someone might recognize
that M is the case but, lacking any macrophysical sense, not recognize
that W is the case and so not recognize how it is that C is the case;
whereas someone who recognizes that W is the case, but is unable to
identify M as the ground of W, can nonetheless recognize how it is that
C is the case.37
It is of course not necessary to agree that W explains C better than M
does in order to accept that W explains C. Likewise, it is not necessary
to agree that G explains V better than P does in order to accept that G
explains V. There is little doubt that W does explain C, nor that W is
distinct from C; for W is a cause of C. I am inclined also to accept that
G does explain V, and that G is distinct from V. Of course, G is not a
cause of V; I am inclined to take it to be a ground of V. I do not have any
argument for this view, but nor do I know of any good argument against
it. If I am right, Picture 1 is to be accepted and Picture 2 rejected; if I
am wrong, Picture 2 may be correct after all. As far as I can tell, the
verdict remains open.
One final point. Let me reiterate that Picture 1, though incompatible
with IG, is perfectly compatible with IG∗. If you are wondering why
anyone might accept both Picture 1 and IG∗, consider this analogy.
37 Compare F. Jackson and P. Pettit, ‘Program Explanation: A General Perspective’,
Mind, Morality, and Explanation, ed. F. Jackson, P. Pettit, and M. Smith (Oxford, 2004),
pp. 129–30.
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Many people assert that there is a strict equivalence between moral
rights and duties that may be put as follows:
(3) Necessarily, S has a right against S∗ that S∗ do a iff S∗ has a duty
to S to do a.
It is far less common to find people asserting the following:
(4) S has a right against S∗ that S∗ do a = df. S∗ has a duty to S to
do a.
I suspect that this is in part because it seems natural, at least in many
cases, to say that, if S∗ has a duty to S, this is because S has the
relevant right against S∗. This would seem to indicate that S∗’s duty is
grounded in S’s right. The sort of right in question is a ‘claim right’, and
we could borrow this terminology to express what is at issue in Picture
1: something’s being good ‘lays claim’ to our favour of that thing.
APPENDIX 1
I have tentatively embraced a view according to which certain
evaluative properties ground certain deontic ones. Might it also be that
certain deontic properties ground certain evaluative ones? I think so.
Suppose that some act a is morally right. Is there anything good
about that? Nothing that I can see. But what if a is performed: is
there anything good about that? It seems reasonable to think so. More
generally, it seems reasonable to say that it is good when something
morally right or fitting occurs and bad when something morally wrong
or unfitting occurs.
It may seem that this view threatens a regress, but I do not think
it does. I have suggested that something’s being intrinsically good
grounds its being intrinsically valuable. If I were now to suggest that
something’s being intrinsically valuable grounds its being intrinsically
good, there would be a regress. But I am not suggesting that. I am
suggesting that something’s being intrinsically good grounds its being
intrinsically valuable, and that its being both intrinsically valuable
and valued is itself a good thing. There is no regress in the offing
here. Suppose, for example, that x is a state of pleasure and therefore
intrinsically good. Its being good calls for a certain response. If that res-
ponse is forthcoming, then some extra good has occurred; but if not, not.
APPENDIX 2
Although Scanlon rejects the thesis that x’s being good (or bad) provides
a reason to respond favourably (or disfavourably) towards x, he appears
to accept the thesis that x’s being morally right (or wrong) provides, or
may provide, a reason to respond favourably (or disfavourably) towards
x. He says:
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Goodness is not a single substantive property which gives us reason to promote
or prefer the things that have it. Rather, to call something good is to claim that
it has other properties (different ones in different cases) which provide such
reasons. But wrongness seems different. In at least a wide range of cases, the
fact that an act is wrong seems itself to provide us with a reason not to do it,
rather than merely indicating the presence of other reasons (although it may
do that as well).38
I have exactly the opposite view. Whereas (I am inclined to say)
goodness does give us a reason to respond in a certain way towards
something, wrongness does not; an act’s being morally wrong just is its
being such that there is a moral reason not to do it.
Dancy reports a suggestion of Derek Parfit’s in support of Scanlon’s
view about the reason-giving nature of wrongness. Suppose that its
being wrong to do some act consists in there being reasons of a certain
sort not to do it. If our performing this act would give us a reason to feel
guilty and others a reason to feel resentful, then that would appear to
give us a further reason not to perform the act in the first place.39 Dancy
resists this suggestion, pointing out that we can simply say instead that
whatever grounds the wrongness of an act also grounds the reason to
feel guilty or resentful if it is performed.40 This seems right. I would
add that, if ‘further reason’ is supposed to signify a strengthening of
the requirement at issue, Parfit’s suggestion seems to pose the risk of
an infinite regress. Suppose that the wrongness of some act consists in
there being a reason of strength n not to do it and grounds a further
reason of strength m to feel guilty or resentful if it is performed, and
that this latter reason amplifies the requirement not to perform the act
in the first place. Then there is a combined reason of strength n + m
not to perform the act. (Addition is not essential to the argument. What
is crucial is that the original requirement is amplified to some extent.)
If there is a reason of strength m to feel guilty or resentful when an act
is performed which is such that there is a reason of strength n not to
do it, then (it would seem) there is a reason of greater strength, m + l,
to feel guilty or resentful when an act is performed which is such that
there is a reason of greater strength, n + m, not to do it. So (it would
seem) there is a reason of strength n + m + l not to perform the original
act. This line of reasoning can be reiterated ad infinitum. The upshot
would seem to be that we might have a reason of infinite strength not
to perform an act that is wrong – an absurd thesis.
Thus I side with Dancy against Scanlon and Parfit here. However, I
do not think that the regress argument establishes my thesis that an
38 Scanlon, What We Owe, p. 11.
39 Dancy, ‘Should We’, pp. 165–6.
40 Dancy, ‘Should We’, p. 167.
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act’s being wrong just is its being such that there is a reason not to
do it. What the argument attacks is the idea that an act’s being wrong
strengthens the requirement not to do it. Someone might accept this
but still claim that an act’s being wrong grounds a requirement not to
do it. For example, let ‘P’ stand for x’s being a state of pain, ‘W’ for x’s
being such that it is (or would be) wrong to bring x about, and ‘N’ for x’s
being such that there is a reason not to bring x about. We could then
picture the claim in a way that mirrors Picture 1:
Picture 11: N
↑
W
↑
P
This is not a picture according to which W strengthens the requirement,
already provided by P, not to bring x about. Hence the regress argument
just given does not count against Picture 11. Nonetheless, I reject
Picture 11 in favour of the following analogue to Picture 2:
Picture 12: W = N
↑
P
I have no argument to give here. I see no reason in principle why a
deontic property should not supervene on some other deontic property
(on the contrary, see the discussion of (3) above); it is just that in this
particular case there seems to me to be just one deontic property at
issue, not two. Picture 12 is not the ‘whole’ picture, of course. Where ‘B’
stands for x’s being intrinsically bad, a more complete picture would,
on the view to which I am inclined, be this:41
Picture 13: W = N
↑
B
↑
P
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